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We propose a simple uncertainty modification for the agent model in normal-form games; at any given strategy profile, the agent can access only a set of possible profiles that are within a certain distance from the actual action profile. We investigate the various instantiations in which the agent chooses her strategy using well-known rationales e.g., considering the worst case, or trying to minimize the regret, to cope with such uncertainty. Any such modification in the behavioral model naturally induces a corresponding notion of equilibrium; a distance-based equilibrium. We characterize the relationships between the various equilibria, and also their connections to well-known existing solution concepts such as Trembling-hand perfection. Furthermore, we deliver existence results, and show that for some class of games, such solution concepts can actually lead to better outcomes.
Despite the many recent practical and theoretical breakthroughs in computational game theory, equilibrium finding in extensive-form team games remains a significant challenge. While NP-hard in the worst case, there are provably efficient algorithms f
We consider polymatrix coordination games with individual preferences where every player corresponds to a node in a graph who plays with each neighbor a separate bimatrix game with non-negative symmetric payoffs. In this paper, we study $alpha$-appro
We study the problem of checking for the existence of constrained pure Nash equilibria in a subclass of polymatrix games defined on weighted directed graphs. The payoff of a player is defined as the sum of nonnegative rational weights on incoming edg
In this paper, we consider the problem of wireless power control in an interference channel where transmitters aim to maximize their own benefit. When the individual payoff or utility function is derived from the transmission efficiency and the spent
In this paper we extend a popular non-cooperative network creation game (NCG) to allow for disconnected equilibrium networks. There are n players, each is a vertex in a graph, and a strategy is a subset of players to build edges to. For each edge a p