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We study variants of the stable marriage and college admissions models in which the agents are allowed to express weak preferences over the set of agents on the other side of the market and the option of remaining unmatched. For the problems that we address, previous authors have presented polynomial-time algorithms for computing a Pareto-stable matching. In the case of college admissions, these algorithms require the preferences of the colleges over groups of students to satisfy a technical condition related to responsiveness. We design new polynomial-time Pareto-stable algorithms for stable marriage and college admissions that correspond to strategyproof mechanisms. For stable marriage, it is known that no Pareto-stable mechanism is strategyproof for all of the agents; our algorithm provides a mechanism that is strategyproof for the agents on one side of the market. For college admissions, it is known that no Pareto-stable mechanism can be strategyproof for the colleges; our algorithm provides a mechanism that is strategyproof for the students.
We study the variant of the stable marriage problem in which the preferences of the agents are allowed to include indifferences. We present a mechanism for producing Pareto-stable matchings in stable marriage markets with indifferences that is group
We initiate the use of a multi-layer neural network to model two-sided matching and to explore the design space between strategy-proofness and stability. It is well known that both properties cannot be achieved simultaneously but the efficient fronti
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension between recomm
We design novel mechanisms for welfare-maximization in two-sided markets. That is, there are buyers willing to purchase items and sellers holding items initially, both acting rationally and strategically in order to maximize utility. Our mechanisms a
Many two-sided matching markets, from labor markets to school choice programs, use a clearinghouse based on the applicant-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm, which is well known to be strategy-proof for the applicants. Nonetheless, a growing amo