اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدWisdom of the institutional crowd
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The average portfolio structure of institutional investors is shown to have properties which account for transaction costs in an optimal way. This implies that financial institutions unknowingly display collective rationality, or Wisdom of the Crowd. Individual deviations from the rational benchmark are ample, which illustrates that system-wide rationality does not need nearly rational individuals. Finally we discuss the importance of accounting for constraints when assessing the presence of Wisdom of the Crowd.
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