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We study correlated equilibria and coarse equilibria of simple first-price single-item auctions in the simplest auction model of full information. Nash equilibria are known to always yield full efficiency and a revenue that is at least the second-highest value. We prove that the same is true for all correlated equilibria, even those in which agents overbid -- i.e., bid above their values. Coarse equilibria, in contrast, may yield lower efficiency and revenue. We show that the revenue can be as low as 26% of the second-highest value in a coarse equilibrium, even if agents are assumed not to overbid, and this is tight. We also show that when players do not overbid, the worst-case bound on social welfare at coarse equilibrium improves from 63% of the highest value to 81%, and this bound is tight as well.
We investigate the computation of equilibria in extensive-form games where ex ante correlation is possible, focusing on correlated equilibria requiring the least amount of communication between the players and the mediator. Motivated by the hardness
Our paper concerns the computation of Nash equilibria of first-price auctions with correlated values. While there exist several equilibrium computation methods for auctions with independent values, the correlation of the bidders values introduces sig
This paper studies equilibrium quality of semi-separable position auctions (known as the Ad Types setting) with greedy or optimal allocation combined with generalized second-price (GSP) or Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) pricing. We make three contributi
In this work we investigate the strategic learning implications of the deployment of sponsored search auction mechanisms that obey to fairness criteria. We introduce a new class of mechanisms composing a traditional Generalized Second Price auction (
In this paper, we consider the problem of wireless power control in an interference channel where transmitters aim to maximize their own benefit. When the individual payoff or utility function is derived from the transmission efficiency and the spent