اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدCooperation and Competition among Energy Storages
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نشر من قبل
Jesus Contreras Ocana
تاريخ النشر
2015
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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We study competition and cooperation among a group of storage units. We show that as the number of storages increases, the profit of storages approaches zero under Nash competition. We propose two ways in which storages can achieve non-zero profit and show that they are optimal in the sense that storages achieve the maximum possible profit. The first is a decentralized approach in which storages are exposed to artificial cost functions that incentivize them to behavior as a coalition. No private information needs to be exchanged between the storages to calculate the artificial function. The second is a centralized approach in which an aggregator coordinates and splits profits with storages in order to achieve maximum profit. We use Nashs axiomatic bargaining problem to model and predict the profit split between aggregator and storages.
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