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تسجيل مستخدم جديدMechanism design for resource allocation with applications to centralized multi-commodity routing
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We formulate and study the algorithmic mechanism design problem for a general class of resource allocation settings, where the center redistributes the private resources brought by individuals. Money transfer is forbidden. Distinct from the standard literature, which assumes the amount of resources brought by an individual to be public information, we consider this amount as an agents private, possibly multi-dimensional type. Our goal is to design truthful mechanisms that achieve two objectives: max-min and Pareto efficiency. For each objective, we provide a reduction that converts any optimal algorithm into a strategy-proof mechanism that achieves the same objective. Our reductions do not inspect the input algorithms but only query these algorithms as oracles. Applying the reductions, we produce strategy-proof mechanisms in a non-trivial application: network route allocation. Our models and result in the application are valuable on their own rights.
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