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تسجيل مستخدم جديدRoad Pricing for Spreading Peak Travel: Modeling and Design
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نشر من قبل
Tichakorn Wongpiromsarn
تاريخ النشر
2012
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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A case study of the Singapore road network provides empirical evidence that road pricing can significantly affect commuter trip timing behaviors. In this paper, we propose a model of trip timing decisions that reasonably matches the observed commuters behaviors. Our model explicitly captures the difference in individuals sensitivity to price, travel time and early or late arrival at destination. New pricing schemes are suggested to better spread peak travel and reduce traffic congestion. Simulation results based on the proposed model are provided in comparison with the real data for the Singapore case study.
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