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تسجيل مستخدم جديدAlgorithmic Pricing via Virtual Valuations
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Algorithmic pricing is the computational problem that sellers (e.g., in supermarkets) face when trying to set prices for their items to maximize their profit in the presence of a known demand. Guruswami et al. (2005) propose this problem and give logarithmic approximations (in the number of consumers) when each consumers values for bundles are known precisely. Subsequently severa
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We study the problem of designing posted-price mechanisms in order to sell a single unit of a single item within a finite period of time. Motivated by real-world problems, such as, e.g., long-term rental of rooms and apartments, we assume that custom
ers arrive online according to a Poisson process, and their valuations are drawn from an unknown distribution and discounted over time. We evaluate our mechanisms in terms of competitive ratio, measuring the worst-case ratio between their revenue and that of an optimal mechanism that knows the distribution of valuations. First, we focus on the identical valuation setting, where all the customers value the item for the same amount. In this setting, we provide a mechanism M_c that achieves the best possible competitive ratio, discussing its dependency on the parameters in the case of linear discount. Then, we switch to the random valuation setting. We show that, if we restrict the attention to distributions of valuations with a monotone hazard rate, then the competitive ratio of M_c is lower bounded by a strictly positive constant that does not depend on the distribution. Moreover, we provide another mechanism, called M_pc, which is defined by a piecewise constant pricing strategy and reaches performances comparable to those obtained with M_c. This mechanism is useful when the seller cannot change the posted price too often. Finally, we empirically evaluate the performances of our mechanisms in a number of experimental settings.
Standard ad auction formats do not immediately extend to settings where multiple size configurations and layouts are available to advertisers. In these settings, the sale of web advertising space increasingly resembles a combinatorial auction with co
mplementarities, where truthful auctions such as the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) can yield unacceptably low revenue. We therefore study core selecting auctions, which boost revenue by setting payments so that no group of agents, including the auctioneer, can jointly improve their utilities by switching to a different outcome. Our main result is a combinatorial algorithm that finds an approximate bidder optimal core point with almost linear number of calls to the welfare maximization oracle. Our algorithm is faster than previously-proposed heuristics in the literature and has theoretical guarantees. We conclude that core pricing is implementable even for very time sensitive practical use cases such as realtime auctions for online advertising and can yield more revenue. We justify this claim experimentally using the Microsoft Bing Ad Auction data, through which we show our core pricing algorithm generates almost 26% more revenue than VCG on average, about 9% more revenue than other core pricing rules known in the literature, and almost matches the revenue of the standard Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction.
A patient seller aims to sell a good to an impatient buyer (i.e., one who discounts utility over time). The buyer will remain in the market for a period of time $T$, and her private value is drawn from a publicly known distribution. What is the reven
ue-optimal pricing-curve (sequence of (price, time) pairs) for the seller? Is randomization of help here? Is the revenue-optimal pricing-curve computable in polynomial time? We answer these questions in this paper. We give an efficient algorithm for computing the revenue-optimal pricing curve. We show that pricing curves, that post a price at each point of time and let the buyer pick her utility maximizing time to buy, are revenue-optimal among a much broader class of sequential lottery mechanisms: namely, mechanisms that allow the seller to post a menu of lotteries at each point of time cannot get any higher revenue than pricing curves. We also show that the even broader class of mechanisms that allow the menu of lotteries to be adaptively set, can earn strictly higher revenue than that of pricing curves, and the revenue gap can be as big as the support size of the buyers value distribution.
We study online pricing algorithms for the Bayesian selection problem with production constraints and its generalization to the laminar matroid Bayesian online selection problem. Consider a firm producing (or receiving) multiple copies of different p
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We consider the problem of posting prices for unit-demand buyers if all $n$ buyers have identically distributed valuations drawn from a distribution with monotone hazard rate. We show that even with multiple items asymptotically optimal welfare can b
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