ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
In search of a quantum key distribution scheme that could stand up for more drastic eavesdropping attack, I discover a prepare-and-measure scheme using $N$-dimensional quantum particles as information carriers where $N$ is a prime power. Using the Shor-Preskill-type argument, I prove that this scheme is unconditional secure against all attacks allowed by the laws of quantum physics. Incidentally, for $N = 2^n > 2$, each information carrier can be replaced by $n$ entangled qubits. And in this case, I discover an eavesdropping attack on which no unentangled-qubit-based prepare-and-measure quantum key distribution scheme known to date can generate a provably secure key. In contrast, this entangled-qubit-based scheme produces a provably secure key under the same eavesdropping attack whenever $N geq 16$. This demonstrates the advantage of using entangled particles as information carriers to combat certain eavesdropping strategies.
Long-distance quantum communication requires quantum repeaters to overcome photon loss in optical fibers. Here we demonstrate a repeater node with two memory atoms in an optical cavity. Both atoms are individually and repeatedly entangled with photon
Continuous-variable quantum key distribution (CV-QKD) with discrete modulation has received widespread attentions because of its experimental simplicity, lower-cost implementation and ease to multiplex with classical optical communication. Recently,
The fabrication of quantum key distribution (QKD) systems typically involves several parties, thus providing Eve with multiple opportunities to meddle with the devices. As a consequence, conventional hardware and/or software hacking attacks pose natu
Device-independent quantum key distribution (DIQKD) provides the strongest form of secure key exchange, using only the input-output statistics of the devices to achieve information-theoretic security. Although the basic security principles of DIQKD a
Quantum key distribution (QKD) permits information-theoretically secure transmission of digital encryption keys, assuming that the behaviour of the devices employed for the key exchange can be reliably modelled and predicted. Remarkably, no assumptio