اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدDesigning a Competitive Monotone Signaling Equilibrium
75
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
A decision maker (DM) determines a set of reactions that receivers can choose before senders and receivers move in a generalized competitive signaling model with two-sided matching. The DMs optimal design of the unique stronger monotone signaling equilibrium (unique D1 equilibrium) is equivalent to the choice problem of two threshold sender types, one for market entry and the other for pooling on the top. Our analysis sheds light on the impacts of a trade-off between matching efficiency and signaling costs, the relative heterogeneity of receiver types to sender types, and the productivity of the senders action on optimal equilibrium designing.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
McKelvey and Palfrey (1995)s monotone structural Quantal Response Equilibrium theory may be misspecified for the study of monotone behavior.
A collective choice problem is a finite set of social alternatives and a finite set of economic agents with vNM utility functions. We associate a public goods economy with each collective choice problem and establish the existence and efficiency of (
equal income) Lindahl equilibrium allocations. We interpret collective choice problems as cooperative bargaining problems and define a set-valued solution concept, {it the equitable solution} (ES). We provide axioms that characterize ES and show that ES contains the Nash bargaining solution. Our main result shows that the set of ES payoffs is the same a the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs. We consider two applications: in the first, we show that in a large class of matching problems without transfers the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs is the same as the set of (equal income) Walrasian equilibrium payoffs. In our second application, we show that in any discrete exchange economy without transfers every Walrasian equilibrium payoff is a Lindahl equilibrium payoff of the corresponding collective choice market. Moreover, for any cooperative bargaining problem, it is possible to define a set of commodities so that the resulting economys utility possibility set is that bargaining problem {it and} the resulting economys set of Walrasian equilibrium payoffs is the same as the set of Lindahl equilibrium payoffs of the corresponding collective choice market.
We show that, with indivisible goods, the existence of competitive equilibrium fundamentally depends on agents substitution effects, not their income effects. Our Equilibrium Existence Duality allows us to transport results on the existence of compet
itive equilibrium from settings with transferable utility to settings with income effects. One consequence is that net substitutability---which is a strictly weaker condition than gross substitutability---is sufficient for the existence of competitive equilibrium. We also extend the ``demand types classification of valuations to settings with income effects and give necessary and sufficient conditions for a pattern of substitution effects to guarantee the existence of competitive equilibrium.
We examine a patient players behavior when he can build reputations in front of a sequence of myopic opponents. With positive probability, the patient player is a commitment type who plays his Stackelberg action in every period. We characterize the p
atient players action frequencies in equilibrium. Our results clarify the extent to which reputations can refine the patient players behavior and provide new insights to entry deterrence, business transactions, and capital taxation. Our proof makes a methodological contribution by establishing a new concentration inequality.
This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept robust perfect equilibrium for non-cooperative games with a continuum of players, incorporating three types of perturbations. Such an equilibrium is shown to exist (in symmetric mixed strategies and in pu
re strategies) and satisfy the important properties of admissibility, aggregate robustness, and ex post robust perfection. These properties strengthen relevant equilibrium results in an extensive literature on strategic interactions among a large number of agents. Illustrative applications to congestion games and potential games are presented. In the particular case of a congestion game with strictly increasing cost functions, we show that there is a unique symmetric robust perfect equilibrium.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
