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In this paper, we employ a hypergame framework to analyze the single-leader-multiple-followers (SLMF) Stackelberg security game with two typical misinformed situations: misperception and deception. We provide a stability criterion with the help of hyper Nash equilibrium (HNE) to analyze both strategic stability and cognitive stability of equilibria in SLMF games with misinformation. To this end, we find mild stable conditions such that the equilibria with misperception and deception can derive HNE. Moreover, we analyze the robustness of the equilibria to reveal whether the players have the ability to keep their profits.
The concept of leader--follower (or Stackelberg) equilibrium plays a central role in a number of real--world applications of game theory. While the case with a single follower has been thoroughly investigated, results with multiple followers are only
The search problem of computing a textit{leader-follower equilibrium} has been widely investigated in the scientific literature in, almost exclusively, the single-follower setting. Although the textit{optimistic} and textit{pessimisti
While game-theoretic models and algorithms have been developed to combat illegal activities, such as poaching and over-fishing, in green security domains, none of the existing work considers the crucial aspect of community engagement: community membe
A growing body of work in game theory extends the traditional Stackelberg game to settings with one leader and multiple followers who play a Nash equilibrium. Standard approaches for computing equilibria in these games reformulate the followers best
Computational advertising has been studied to design efficient marketing strategies that maximize the number of acquired customers. In an increased competitive market, however, a market leader (a leader) requires the acquisition of new customers as w