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Simple security proof of coherent-one-way quantum key distribution

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 نشر من قبل Hua-Lei Yin
 تاريخ النشر 2021
  مجال البحث فيزياء
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Coherent-one-way quantum key distribution (COW-QKD), possessing the simple experimental setup and the ability against the photon-number-splitting attack, has been implemented in various experiments and commercial applications. However, recent works have proved that current COW-QKD with key rate scaling linearly with transmittance is totally insecure under the zero-error attack. This conclusion leads to a crucial consequence that all the current attempts for practicalization are in vain. To solve this pending issue, here we conduct a minor revision on original COW-QKD while maintaining the original experimental setup as well as the simplicity of implementation. By more precisely estimating the amount of leaked information, we provide an explicit unconditional secure key rate which scales with $0.7%$ of the bound that quadratically scales with transmittance. Our work provides a revised COW-QKD which guarantees the availability of the current implementations of COW-QKD within 100 km and establishes the theoretical foundations for further application.

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