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تسجيل مستخدم جديدA new quantum game framework: When player strategies are via directional choices
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For two-player quantum games, a Nash equilibrium consists of a pair of unitary operators. Here we present a scheme for such games in which each players strategy consists of choosing the orientation of a unit vector and Nash equilibria of the game are directional pairs. Corresponding classical games are then recovered from constraints placed on each players directional choices.
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