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Based on the success of recommender systems in e-commerce, there is growing interest in their use in matching markets (e.g., labor). While this holds potential for improving market fluidity and fairness, we show in this paper that naively applying existing recommender systems to matching markets is sub-optimal. Considering the standard process where candidates apply and then get evaluated by employers, we present a new recommendation framework to model this interaction mechanism and propose efficient algorithms for computing personalized rankings in this setting. We show that the optimal rankings need to not only account for the potentially divergent preferences of candidates and employers, but they also need to account for capacity constraints. This makes conventional ranking systems that merely rank by some local score (e.g., one-sided or reciprocal relevance) highly sub-optimal -- not only for an individual user, but also for societal goals (e.g., low unemployment). To address this shortcoming, we propose the first method for jointly optimizing the rankings for all candidates in the market to explicitly maximize social welfare. In addition to the theoretical derivation, we evaluate the method both on simulated environments and on data from a real-world networking-recommendation system that we built and fielded at a large computer science conference.
The most important task in personalized news recommendation is accurate matching between candidate news and user interest. Most of existing news recommendation methods model candidate news from its textual content and user interest from their clicked
User and item reviews are valuable for the construction of recommender systems. In general, existing review-based methods for recommendation can be broadly categorized into two groups: the siamese models that build static user and item representation
We introduce the concept of emph{expected exposure} as the average attention ranked items receive from users over repeated samples of the same query. Furthermore, we advocate for the adoption of the principle of equal expected exposure: given a fixed
Recently, using different channels to model social semantic information, and using self-supervised learning tasks to maintain the characteristics of each channel when fusing the information, which has been proven to be a very promising work. However,
We study dynamic matching in exchange markets with easy- and hard-to-match agents. A greedy policy, which attempts to match agents upon arrival, ignores the positive externality that waiting agents generate by facilitating future matchings. We prove