اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدOrdered Reference Dependent Choice
71
0
0.0
(
0
)
تأليف
Xi Zhi Lim
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We study how violations of structural assumptions like expected utility and exponential discounting can be connected to reference dependent preferences with set-dependent reference points, even if behavior conforms with these assumptions when the reference is fixed. An axiomatic framework jointly and systematically relaxes general rationality (WARP) and structural assumptions to capture reference dependence across domains. It gives rise to a linear order that determines references points, which in turn determines the preference parameters for a choice problem. This allows us to study risk, time, and social preferences collectively, where seemingly independent anomalies are interconnected through the lens of reference-dependent choice.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
We examine the long-term behavior of a Bayesian agent who has a misspecified belief about the time lag between actions and feedback, and learns about the payoff consequences of his actions over time. Misspecified beliefs about time lags result in att
ribution errors, which have no long-term effect when the agents action converges, but can lead to arbitrarily large long-term inefficiencies when his action cycles. Our proof uses concentration inequalities to bound the frequency of action switches, which are useful to study learning problems with history dependence. We apply our methods to study a policy choice game between a policy-maker who has a correctly specified belief about the time lag and the public who has a misspecified belief.
We study a model in which before a conflict between two parties escalates into a war (in the form of an all-pay auction), a party can offer a take-it-or-leave-it bribe to the other one for a peaceful settlement. We distinguish between various degrees
of peace prospects--implementability, weak security and strong security. We first characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for peace implementability and weak security. We then show that weak security implies strong security. We also consider a requesting-a-bribe game and characterize the necessary and sufficient conditions for existence of a robust peaceful equilibrium. We find that all such robust peaceful equilibria share the same request.
We study the payoffs that can arise under some information structure from an interim perspective. There is a set of types distributed according to some prior distribution and a payoff function that assigns a value to each pair of a type and a belief
over the types. Any information structure induces an interim payoff profile which describes, for each type, the expected payoff under the information structure conditional on the type. We characterize the set of all interim payoff profiles consistent with some information structure. We illustrate our results through applications.
We study the impact of weak identification in discrete choice models, and provide insights into the determinants of identification strength in these models. Using these insights, we propose a novel test that can consistently detect weak identificatio
n in commonly applied discrete choice models, such as probit, logit, and many of their extensions. Furthermore, we demonstrate that when the null hypothesis of weak identification is rejected, Wald-based inference can be carried out using standard formulas and critical values. A Monte Carlo study compares our proposed testing approach against commonly applied weak identification tests. The results simultaneously demonstrate the good performance of our approach and the fundamental failure of using conventional weak identification tests for linear models in the discrete choice model context. Furthermore, we compare our approach against those commonly applied in the literature in two empirical examples: married women labor force participation, and US food aid and civil conflicts.
We study conditions for the existence of stable and group-strategy-proof mechanisms in a many-to-one matching model with contracts if students preferences are monotone in contract terms. We show that equivalence, properly defined, to a choice profile
under which contracts are substitutes and the law of aggregate holds is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a stable and group-strategy-proof mechanism. Our result can be interpreted as a (weak) embedding result for choice functions under which contracts are observable substitutes and the observable law of aggregate demand holds.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
