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تسجيل مستخدم جديدHypothetical Beliefs Identify Information
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Jonathan Libgober
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After observing the outcome of a Blackwell experiment, a Bayesian decisionmaker can form (a) posterior beliefs over the state, as well as (b) posterior beliefs she would observe any given signal (assuming an independent draw from the same experiment). I call the latter her contingent hypothetical beliefs. I show geometrically how contingent hypothetical beliefs relate to information structures. Specifically, the information structure can (generically) be derived by regressing contingent hypothetical beliefs on posterior beliefs over the state. Her prior is the unit eigenvector of a matrix determined from her posterior beliefs over the state and her contingent hypothetical beliefs. Thus, all aspects of a decisionmakers information acquisition problem can be determined using ex-post data (i.e., beliefs after having received signals). I compare my results to similar ones obtained in cases where information is modeled deterministically; the focus on single-agent stochastic information distinguishes my work.
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