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تسجيل مستخدم جديدCybersecurity in Smart Farming: Canada Market Research
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The Cyber Science Lab (CSL) and Smart Cyber-Physical System (SCPS) Lab at the University of Guelph conduct a market study of cybersecurity technology adoption and requirements for smart and precision farming in Canada. We conducted 17 stakeholder/key opinion leader interviews in Canada and the USA, as well as conducting extensive secondary research, to complete this study. Each interview generally required 15-20 minutes to complete. Interviews were conducted using a client-approved interview guide. Secondary and primary research focussed on the following areas of investigation: Market size and segmentation Market forecast and growth rate Competitive landscape Market challenges/barriers to entry Market trends/growth drivers Adoption/commercialization of the technology
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