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تسجيل مستخدم جديدGeneralized Opinion Dynamics Model for Social Trust Networks in Opinion Maximization
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In this paper, we propose a generalized opinion dynamics model (GODM), which can dynamically compute each persons expressed opinion, to solve the internal opinion maximization problem for social trust networks. In the model, we propose a new, reasonable and interpretable confidence index, which is determined by both persons social status and the evaluation around him. By using the theory of diagonally dominant, we obtain the optimal analytic solution of the Nash equilibrium with maximum overall opinion. We design a novel algorithm to maximize the overall with given budget by modifying the internal opinions of people in the social trust network, and prove its optimality both from the algorithm itself and the traditional optimization algorithm-ADMM algorithms with $l_1$-regulations. A series of experiments are conducted, and the experimental results show that our method is superior to the state-of-the-art in four datasets. The average benefit has promoted $67.5%$, $83.2%$, $31.5%$, and $33.7%$ on four datasets, respectively.
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