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تسجيل مستخدم جديدOptimal management of DC pension fund under relative performance ratio and VaR constraint
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In this paper, we investigate the optimal management of defined contribution (abbr. DC) pension plan under relative performance ratio and Value-at-Risk (abbr. VaR) constraint. Inflation risk is introduced in this paper and the financial market consists of cash, inflation-indexed zero coupon bond and a stock. The goal of the pension manager is to maximize the performance ratio of the real terminal wealth under VaR constraint. An auxiliary process is introduced to transform the original problem into a self-financing problem first. Combining linearization method, Lagrange dual method, martingale method and concavification method, we obtain the optimal terminal wealth under different cases. For convex penalty function, there are fourteen cases while for concave penalty function, there are six cases. Besides, when the penalty function and reward function are both power functions, the explicit forms of the optimal investment strategies are obtained. Numerical examples are shown in the end of this paper to illustrate the impacts of the performance ratio and VaR constraint.
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