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Cancer cells obtain mutations which rely on the production of diffusible growth factors to confer a fitness benefit. These mutations can be considered cooperative, and studied as public goods games within the framework of evolutionary game theory. The population structure, benefit function and update rule all influence the evolutionary success of cooperators. We model the evolution of cooperation in epithelial cells using the Voronoi tessellation model. Unlike traditional evolutionary graph theory, this allows us to implement global updating, for which birth and death events are spatially decoupled. We compare, for a sigmoid benefit function, the conditions for cooperation to be favoured and/or beneficial for well mixed and structured populations. We find that when population structure is combined with global updating, cooperation is more successful than if there were local updating or the population were well-mixed. Interestingly, the qualitative behaviour for the well-mixed population and the Voronoi tessellation model is remarkably similar, but the latter case requires significantly lower incentives to ensure cooperation.
Public goods games in undirected networks are generally known to have pure Nash equilibria, which are easy to find. In contrast, we prove that, in directed networks, a broad range of public goods games have intractable equilibrium problems: The exist
Finding ways to overcome the temptation to exploit one another is still a challenge in behavioural sciences. In the framework of evolutionary game theory, punishing strategies are frequently used to promote cooperation in competitive environments. He
Bacterial quorum sensing is the communication that takes place between bacteria as they secrete certain molecules into the intercellular medium that later get absorbed by the secreting cells themselves and by others. Depending on cell density, this u
Productive societies feature high levels of cooperation and strong connections between individuals. Public Goods Games (PGGs) are frequently used to study the development of social connections and cooperative behavior in model societies. In such game
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially excludable along social links. Individuals face a capacity constraint in that, conditional upon providing, they may nominate only a subset of neighbours as co-beneficiaries. Our mode