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Quantum cryptography or, more precisely, quantum key distribution (QKD), is one of the advanced areas in the field of quantum technologies. The confidentiality of keys distributed with the use of QKD protocols is guaranteed by the fundamental laws of quantum mechanics. This paper is devoted to the decoy state method, a countermeasure against vulnerabilities caused by the use of coherent states of light for QKD protocols whose security is proved under the assumption of single-photon states. We give a formal security proof of the decoy state method against all possible attacks. We compare two widely known attacks on multiphoton pulses: photon-number splitting and beam splitting. Finally, we discuss the equivalence of polarization and phase coding.
Information-theoretical security of quantum key distribution (QKD) has been convincingly proven in recent years and remarkable experiments have shown the potential of QKD for real world applications. Due to its unique capability of combining high key
We analyse the finite-size security of the efficient Bennett-Brassard 1984 protocol implemented with decoy states and apply the results to a gigahertz-clocked quantum key distribution system. Despite the enhanced security level, the obtained secure k
Decoy state protocols are a useful tool for many quantum key distribution systems implemented with weak coherent pulses, allowing significantly better secret bit rates and longer maximum distances. In this paper we present a method to numerically fin
Quantum key distribution establishes a secret string of bits between two distant parties. Of concern in weak laser pulse schemes is the especially strong photon number splitting attack by an eavesdropper, but the decoy state method can detect this at
Twin-Field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) and its variants, e.g. Phase-Matching QKD, Sending-or-not-sending QKD, and No Phase Post-Selection TFQKD promise high key rates at long distance to beat the rate distance limit without a repeater. The secu