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تسجيل مستخدم جديدAnonymity with Tor: A Survey on Tor Attacks
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Anonymity networks are becoming increasingly popular in todays online world as more users attempt to safeguard their online privacy. Tor is currently the most popular anonymity network in use and provides anonymity to both users and services (hidden services). However, the anonymity provided by Tor is also being misused in various ways. Hosting illegal sites for selling drugs, hosting command and control servers for botnets, and distributing censored content are but a few such examples. As a result, various parties, including governments and law enforcement agencies, are interested in attacks that assist in de-anonymising the Tor network, disrupting its operations, and bypassing its censorship circumvention mechanisms. In this paper, we survey known Tor attacks and identify currently available techniques that lead to improved de-anonymisation of users and hidden services.
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