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تسجيل مستخدم جديدGradient-free Online Learning in Games with Delayed Rewards
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نشر من قبل
Panayotis Mertikopoulos
تاريخ النشر
2020
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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Motivated by applications to online advertising and recommender systems, we consider a game-theoretic model with delayed rewards and asynchronous, payoff-based feedback. In contrast to previous work on delayed multi-armed bandits, we focus on multi-player games with continuous action spaces, and we examine the long-run behavior of strategic agents that follow a no-regret learning policy (but are otherwise oblivious to the game being played, the objectives of their opponents, etc.). To account for the lack of a consistent stream of information (for instance, rewards can arrive out of order, with an a priori unbounded delay, etc.), we introduce a gradient-free learning policy where payoff information is placed in a priority queue as it arrives. In this general context, we derive new bounds for the agents regret; furthermore, under a standard diagonal concavity assumption, we show that the induced sequence of play converges to Nash equilibrium with probability $1$, even if the delay between choosing an action and receiving the corresponding reward is unbounded.
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