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Increased-confidence adversarial examples for improved transferability of Counter-Forensic attacks

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 نشر من قبل Benedetta Tondi
 تاريخ النشر 2020
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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Transferability of adversarial examples is a key issue to study the security of multimedia forensics (MMF) techniques relying on Deep Learning (DL). The transferability of the attacks, in fact, would open the way to the deployment of successful counter forensics attacks also in cases where the attacker does not have a full knowledge of the to-be-attacked system. Some preliminary works have shown that adversarial examples against CNN-based image forensics detectors are in general non-transferrable, at least when the bas



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