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This paper introduces a microscopic approach to model epidemics, which can explicitly consider the consequences of individuals decisions on the spread of the disease. We first formulate a microscopic multi-agent epidemic model where every agent can choose its activity level that affects the spread of the disease. Then by minimizing agents cost functions, we solve for the optimal decisions for individual agents in the framework of game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning. Given the optimal decisions of all agents, we can make predictions about the spread of the disease. We show that there are negative externalities in the sense that infected agents do not have enough incentives to protect others, which then necessitates external interventions to regulate agents behaviors. In the discussion section, future directions are pointed out to make the model more realistic.
Microscopic epidemic models are powerful tools for government policy makers to predict and simulate epidemic outbreaks, which can capture the impact of individual behaviors on the macroscopic phenomenon. However, existing models only consider simple
Pursuit-evasion is the problem of capturing mobile targets with one or more pursuers. We use deep reinforcement learning for pursuing an omni-directional target with multiple, homogeneous agents that are subject to unicycle kinematic constraints. We
Humanity faces numerous problems of common-pool resource appropriation. This class of multi-agent social dilemma includes the problems of ensuring sustainable use of fresh water, common fisheries, grazing pastures, and irrigation systems. Abstract mo
Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning often requires decentralised policies, which severely limit the agents ability to coordinate their behaviour. In this paper, we show that common knowledge between agents allows for complex decentralised
Agent advising is one of the main approaches to improve agent learning performance by enabling agents to share advice. Existing advising methods have a common limitation that an adviser agent can offer advice to an advisee agent only if the advice is