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تسجيل مستخدم جديدIndependent security analysis of a commercial quantum random number generator
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We reverse-engineer, test and analyse hardware and firmware of the commercial quantum-optical random number generator Quantis from ID Quantique. We show that > 99% of its output data originates in physically random processes: random timing of photon absorption in a semiconductor material, and random growth of avalanche owing to impact ionisation. We have also found minor non-random contributions from imperfections in detector electronics and an internal processing algorithm. Our work shows that the design quality of a commercial quantum-optical randomness source can be verified without cooperation of the manufacturer and without access to the engineering documentation.
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