اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدAll-Pay Auctions as Models for Trade Wars and Military Annexation
60
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We explore an application of all-pay auctions to model trade wars and territorial annexation. Specifically, in the model we consider the expected resource, production, and aggressive (military/tariff) power are public information, but actual resource levels are private knowledge. We consider the resource transfer at the end of such a competition which deprives the weaker country of some fraction of its original resources. In particular, we derive the quasi-equilibria strategies for two country conflicts under different scenarios. This work is relevant for the ongoing US-China trade war, and the recent Russian capture of Crimea, as well as historical and future conflicts.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
In an auction each party bids a certain amount and the one which bids the highest is the winner. Interestingly, auctions can also be used as models for other real-world systems. In an all pay auction all parties must pay a forfeit for bidding. In the
most commonly studied all pay auction, parties forfeit their entire bid, and this has been considered as a model for expenditure on political campaigns. Here we consider a number of alternative forfeits which might be used as models for different real-world competitions, such as preparing bids for defense or infrastructure contracts.
We study the design of auction within the correlation-robust framework in which the auctioneer is assumed to have information only about marginal distributions, but does not know the correlation structure of the joint distribution. The performance of
a mechanism is evaluated in the worst-case over the uncertainty of joint distributions that are consistent with the marginal distributions. For the two-bidder case, we characterize the Second Price Auction with Uniformly Distributed Reserves as a maxmin auction among dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and ex-post individually rational (EPIR) mechanisms under the robust-version regularity conditions. For the $N$-bidder ($Nge 3$) case, we characterize the Second Price Auction with $Beta (frac{1}{N-1},1)$ Distributed Reserves as a maxmin auction among exclusive (a bidder whose bid is not the highest will never be allocated) DSIC and EPIR mechanisms under the general robust-version regularity conditions (I).
We study the design of revenue-maximizing bilateral trade mechanisms in the correlated private value environment. We assume the designer only knows the expectations of the agents values, but knows neither the marginal distribution nor the correlation
structure. The performance of a mechanism is evaluated in the worst-case over the uncertainty of joint distributions that are consistent with the known expectations. Among all dominant-strategy incentive compatible and ex-post individually rational mechanisms, we provide a complete characterization of the maxmin trade mechanisms and the worst-case joint distributions.
Incentives are key to the success of crowdsourcing which heavily depends on the level of user participation. This paper designs an incentive mechanism to motivate a heterogeneous crowd of users to actively participate in crowdsourcing campaigns. We c
ast the problem in a new, asymmetric all-pay contest model with incomplete information, where an arbitrary n of users exert irrevocable effort to compete for a prize tuple. The prize tuple is an array of prize functions as opposed to a single constant prize typically used by conventional contests. We design an optimal contest that (a) induces the maximum profit---total user effort minus the prize payout---for the crowdsourcer, and (b) ensures users to strictly have the incentive to participate. In stark contrast to intuition and prior related work, our mechanism induces an equilibrium in which heterogeneous users behave independently of one another as if they were in a homogeneous setting. This newly discovered property, which we coin as strategy autonomy (SA), is of practical significance: it (a) reduces computational and storage complexity by n-fold for each user, (b) increases the crowdsourcers revenue by counteracting an effort reservation effect existing in asymmetric contests, and (c) neutralizes the (almost universal) law of diminishing marginal returns (DMR). Through an extensive numerical case study, we demonstrate and scrutinize the superior profitability of our mechanism, as well as draw insights into the SA property.
As the amount of data collected for crowdsensing applications increases rapidly due to improved sensing capabilities and the increasing number of Internet of Things (IoT) devices, the cloud server is no longer able to handle the large-scale datasets
individually. Given the improved computational capabilities of the edge devices, coded distributed computing has become a promising approach given that it allows computation tasks to be carried out in a distributed manner while mitigating straggler effects, which often account for the long overall completion times. Specifically, by using polynomial codes, computed results from only a subset of devices are needed to reconstruct the final result. However, there is no incentive for the edge devices to complete the computation tasks. In this paper, we present an all-pay auction to incentivize the edge devices to participate in the coded computation tasks. In this auction, the bids of the edge devices are represented by the allocation of their Central Processing Unit (CPU) power to the computation tasks. All edge devices submit their bids regardless of whether they win or lose in the auction. The all-pay auction is designed to maximize the utility of the cloud server by determining the reward allocation to the winners. Simulation results show that the edge devices are incentivized to allocate more CPU power when multiple rewards are offered instead of a single reward.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
