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تسجيل مستخدم جديدSybil-Resilient Social Choice with Partial Participation
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Voting rules may fail to implement the will of the society when only some voters actively participate, and/or in the presence of sybil (fake or duplicate) voters. Here we aim to address social choice in the presence of sybils and voter abstention. To do so we assume the status-quo (Reality) as an ever-present distinguished alternative, and study Reality Enforcing voting rules, which add virtual votes in support of the status-quo. We measure the tradeoff between safety and liveness (the ability of active honest voters to maintain/change the status-quo, respectively) in a variety of domains, and show that the Reality Enforcing voting rule is optimal in this respect.
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