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Unsupervised Domain Adaptation (UDA) is crucial to tackle the lack of annotations in a new domain. There are many multi-modal datasets, but most UDA approaches are uni-modal. In this work, we explore how to learn from multi-modality and propose cross-modal UDA (xMUDA) where we assume the presence of 2D images and 3D point clouds for 3D semantic segmentation. This is challenging as the two input spaces are heterogeneous and can be impacted differently by domain shift. In xMUDA, modalities learn from each other through mutual mimicking, disentangled from the segmentation objective, to prevent the stronger modality from adopting false predictions from the weaker one. We evaluate on new UDA scenarios including day-to-night, country-to-country and dataset-to-dataset, leveraging recent autonomous driving datasets. xMUDA brings large improvements over uni-modal UDA on all tested scenarios, and is complementary to state-of-the-art UDA techniques. Code is available at https://github.com/valeoai/xmuda.
Domain adaptation is an important task to enable learning when labels are scarce. While most works focus only on the image modality, there are many important multi-modal datasets. In order to leverage multi-modality for domain adaptation, we propose
Unsupervised Domain Adaptation for semantic segmentation has gained immense popularity since it can transfer knowledge from simulation to real (Sim2Real) by largely cutting out the laborious per pixel labeling efforts at real. In this work, we presen
Domain adaptation is critical for success when confronting with the lack of annotations in a new domain. As the huge time consumption of labeling process on 3D point cloud, domain adaptation for 3D semantic segmentation is of great expectation. With
Convolutional neural network-based approaches have achieved remarkable progress in semantic segmentation. However, these approaches heavily rely on annotated data which are labor intensive. To cope with this limitation, automatically annotated data g
Recent studies imply that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples -- inputs with a slight but intentional perturbation are incorrectly classified by the network. Such vulnerability makes it risky for some security-related applicat