اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدSome analytically solvable problems of the mean-field games theory
56
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
We study the mean field games equations, consisting of the coupled Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck and Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. The equations are complemented by initial and terminal conditions. It is shown that with some specific choice of data, this problem can be reduced to solving a quadratically nonlinear system of ODEs. This situation occurs naturally in economic applications. As an example, the problem of forming an investors opinion on an asset is considered.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
We study in this paper three aspects of Mean Field Games. The first one is the case when the dynamics of each player depend on the strategies of the other players. The second one concerns the modeling of noise in discrete space models and the formu
lation of the Master Equation in this case. Finally, we show how Mean Field Games reduce to agent based models when the intertemporal preference rate goes to infinity, i.e. when the anticipation of the players vanishes.
We study first order evolutive Mean Field Games where the Hamiltonian is non-coercive. This situation occurs, for instance, when some directions are forbidden to the generic player at some points. We establish the existence of a weak solution of the
system via a vanishing viscosity method and, mainly, we prove that the evolution of the populations density is the push-forward of the initial density through the flow characterized almost everywhere by the optimal trajectories of the control problem underlying the Hamilton-Jacobi equation. As preliminary steps, we need that the optimal trajectories for the control problem are unique (at least for a.e. starting points) and that the optimal controls can be expressed in terms of the horizontal gradient of the value function.
In this note we prove the uniqueness of solutions to a class of Mean Field Games systems subject to possibly degenerate individual noise. Our results hold true for arbitrary long time horizons and for general non-separable Hamiltonians that satisfy a
so-called $displacement monotonicity$ condition. Ours are the first global in time uniqueness results, beyond the well-known Lasry-Lions monotonicity condition, for the Mean Field Games systems involving non-separable Hamiltonians. The displacement monotonicity assumptions imposed on the data provide actually not only uniqueness, but also the existence and regularity of the solutions.
In the present work, we study deterministic mean field games (MFGs) with finite time horizon in which the dynamics of a generic agent is controlled by the acceleration. They are described by a system of PDEs coupling a continuity equation for the den
sity of the distribution of states (forward in time) and a Hamilton-Jacobi (HJ) equation for the optimal value of a representative agent (backward in time). The state variable is the pair $(x, v)in R^Ntimes R^N$ where x stands for the position and v stands for the velocity. The dynamics is often referred to as the double integrator. In this case, the Hamiltonian of the system is neither strictly convex nor coercive, hence the available results on MFGs cannot be applied. Moreover, we will assume that the Hamiltonian is unbounded w.r.t. the velocity variable v. We prove the existence of a weak solution of the MFG system via a vanishing viscosity method and we characterize the distribution of states as the image of the initial distribution by the flow associated with the optimal control.
This work establishes the equivalence between Mean Field Game and a class of compressible Navier-Stokes equations for their connections by Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations. The existence of the Nash Equilibrium of the Mean Field Game, and hence the
solvability of Navier-Stokes equations, are provided under a set of conditions.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
