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Boot firmware, like UEFI-compliant firmware, has been the target of numerous attacks, giving the attacker control over the entire system while being undetected. The measured boot mechanism of a computer platform ensures its integrity by using cryptographic measurements to detect such attacks. This is typically performed by relying on a Trusted Platform Module (TPM). Recent work, however, shows that vendors do not respect the specifications that have been devised to ensure the integrity of the firmwares loading process. As a result, attackers may bypass such measurement mechanisms and successfully load a modified firmware image while remaining unnoticed. In this paper we introduce BootKeeper, a static analysis approach verifying a set of key security properties on boot firmware images before deployment, to ensure the integrity of the measured boot process. We evaluate BootKeeper against several attacks on common boot firmware implementations and demonstrate its applicability.
The contextual information (i.e., the time and location) in which a photo is taken can be easily tampered with or falsely claimed by forgers to achieve malicious purposes, e.g., creating fear among the general public. A rich body of work has focused
Session management is a fundamental component of web applications: despite the apparent simplicity, correctly implementing web sessions is extremely tricky, as witnessed by the large number of existing attacks. This motivated the design of formal met
We introduce the use, monitoring, and enforcement of integrity constraints in trust management-style authorization systems. We consider what portions of the policy state must be monitored to detect violations of integrity constraints. Then we address
In this paper, we have studied how the text of an ancient literature on how their integrity has been preserved for several centuries. Specifically, The Vedas is an ancient literature, which has its text remained preserved without any corruption for t
Control-flow hijacking attacks are used to perform malicious com-putations. Current solutions for assessing the attack surface afteracontrol flow integrity(CFI) policy was applied can measure onlyindirect transfer averages in the best case without pr