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تسجيل مستخدم جديدDesign of auction-based approach for market clearing in peer-to-peer market platform
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This paper designs a market platform for Peer-to-Peer (P2P) energy trading in Transactive Energy (TE) systems, where prosumers and consumers actively participate in the market as seller or buyer to trade energy. An auction-based approach is used for market clearing in the proposed platform and a review of different types of auction is performed. The appropriate auction approach for market clearing in the proposed platform is designed. The proposed auction mechanism is implemented in three steps namely determination, allocation and payment. This paper identifies important P2P market clearing performance indices, which are used to compare and contrast the designed auction with different types of auction mechanisms. Comparative studies demonstrate the efficacy of the proposed auction mechanism for market clearing in the P2P platform.
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