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Differential cryptanalysis of image cipher using block-based scrambling and image filtering

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 نشر من قبل Feng Yu
 تاريخ النشر 2018
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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Recently, an image encryption algorithm using block-based scrambling and image filtering has been proposed by Hua et al. In this paper, we analyze the security problems of the encryption algorithm in detail and break the encryption by a codebook attack. We construct an linear relation between plain-images and cipher-images by differential cryptanalysis. With this linear relation, we build a codebook containing $(M times N + 1)$ pairs of plain-images and cipher-images, where $Mtimes N$ is the size of images. The proposed codebook attack indicates that the encryption scheme is insecure. To resist the codebook attack, an improved algorithm is proposed. Experimental results show that the improved algorithm not only inherits the merits of the original scheme, but also has stronger security against the differential cryptanalysis.



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