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تسجيل مستخدم جديدPrior-free Data Acquisition for Accurate Statistical Estimation
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We study a data analysts problem of acquiring data from self-interested individuals to obtain an accurate estimation of some statistic of a population, subject to an expected budget constraint. Each data holder incurs a cost, which is unknown to the data analyst, to acquire and report his data. The cost can be arbitrarily correlated with the data. The data analyst has an expected budget that she can use to incentivize individuals to provide their data. The goal is to design a joint acquisition-estimation mechanism to optimize the performance of the produced estimator, without any prior information on the underlying distribution of cost and data. We investigate two types of estimations: unbiased point estimation and confidence interval estimation. Unbiased estimators: We design a truthful, individually rational, online mechanism to acquire data from individuals and output an unbiased estimator of the population mean when the data analyst has no prior information on the cost-data distribution and individuals arrive in a random order. The performance of this mechanism matches that of the optimal mechanism, which knows the true cost distribution, within a constant factor. The performance of an estimator is evaluated by its variance under the worst-case cost-data correlation. Confidence intervals: We characterize an approximately optimal (within a factor $2$) mechanism for obtaining a confidence interval of the population mean when the data analyst knows the true cost distribution at the beginning. This mechanism is efficiently computable. We then design a truthful, individually rational, online algorithm that is only worse than the approximately optimal mechanism by a constant factor. The performance of an estimator is evaluated by its expected length under the worst-case cost-data correlation.
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