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In the standard Mechanism Design framework (Hurwicz-Reiter), there is a central authority that gathers agents messages and subsequently determines the allocation and tax for each agent. We consider a scenario where, due to communication overhead and other constraints, such broadcasting of messages to a central authority cannot take place. Instead, only local message exchange is allowed between agents. As a result, each agent should be able to determine her own allocation and tax based on the messages in the local neighborhood, as defined by a given message graph describing the communication constraints. This scenario gives rise to a novel research direction that we call Distributed Mechanism Design. In this paper, we propose such a distributed mechanism for the problem of rate allocation in a multicast transmission network. The proposed mechanism fully implements the optimal allocation in Nash equilibria and its message space dimension is linear with respect to the number of agents in the network.
We describe a structured system for distributed mechanism design. It consists of a sequence of layers. The lower layers deal with the operations relevant for distributed computing only, while the upper layers are concerned only with communication amo
In the standard Mechanism Design framework, agents messages are gathered at a central point and allocation/tax functions are calculated in a centralized manner, i.e., as functions of all network agents messages. This requirement may cause communicati
A distributed machine learning platform needs to recruit many heterogeneous worker nodes to finish computation simultaneously. As a result, the overall performance may be degraded due to straggling workers. By introducing redundancy into computation,
We consider revenue-optimal mechanism design in the interdimensional setting, where one dimension is the value of the buyer, and one is a type that captures some auxiliary information. One setting is the FedEx Problem, for which FGKK [2016] character
Game theory is often used as a tool to analyze decentralized systems and their properties, in particular, blockchains. In this note, we take the opposite view. We argue that blockchains can and should be used to implement economic mechanisms because