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تسجيل مستخدم جديدStochastic Dynamic Utilities and Inter-Temporal Preferences
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We propose an axiomatic approach which economically underpins the representation of dynamic preferences in terms of a stochastic utility function, sensitive to the information available to the decision maker. Our construction is iterative and based on inter-temporal preference relations, whose characterization is inpired by the original intuition given by Debreus State Dependent Utilities (1960).
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