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The distributed hypothesis testing problem with full side-information is studied. The trade-off (reliability function) between the two types of error exponents under limited rate is studied in the following way. First, the problem is reduced to the problem of determining the reliability function of channel codes designed for detection (in analogy to a similar result which connects the reliability function of distributed lossless compression and ordinary channel codes). Second, a single-letter random-coding bound based on a hierarchical ensemble, as well as a single-letter expurgated bound, are derived for the reliability of channel-detection codes. Both bounds are derived for a system which employs the optimal detection rule. We conjecture that the resulting random-coding bound is ensemble-tight, and consequently optimal within the class of quantization-and-binning schemes.
We consider the problem of distributed binary hypothesis testing of two sequences that are generated by an i.i.d. doubly-binary symmetric source. Each sequence is observed by a different terminal. The two hypotheses correspond to different levels of
We study a hypothesis testing problem in which data is compressed distributively and sent to a detector that seeks to decide between two possible distributions for the data. The aim is to characterize all achievable encoding rates and exponents of th
We revisit the universal outlier hypothesis testing (Li emph{et al.}, TIT 2014) and derive fundamental limits for the optimal test. In outlying hypothesis testing, one is given multiple observed sequences, where most sequences are generated i.i.d. fr
In this paper study the problem of signal detection in Gaussian noise in a distributed setting. We derive a lower bound on the size that the signal needs to have in order to be detectable. Moreover, we exhibit optimal distributed testing strategies that attain the lower bound.
We investigate the impact of Byzantine attacks in distributed detection under binary hypothesis testing. It is assumed that a fraction of the transmitted sensor measurements are compromised by the injected data from a Byzantine attacker, whose purpos