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تسجيل مستخدم جديدHelPal: A Search System for Mobile Crowd Service
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Proliferation of ubiquitous mobile devices makes location based services prevalent. Mobile users are able to volunteer as providers of specific services and in the meanwhile to search these services. For example, drivers may be interested in tracking available nearby users who are willing to help with motor repair or are willing to provide travel directions or first aid. With the diffusion of mobile users, it is necessary to provide scalable means of enabling such users to connect with other nearby users so that they can help each other with specific services. Motivated by these observations, we design and implement a general location based system HelPal for mobile users to provide and enjoy instant service, which is called mobile crowd service. In this demo, we introduce a mobile crowd service system featured with several novel techniques. We sketch the system architecture and illustrate scenarios via several cases. Demonstration shows the user-friendly search interface for users to conveniently find skilled and qualified nearby service providers.
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