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We study the outcome of deferred acceptance when prospective medical residents can only apply to a limited set of hospitals. This limitation requires residents to make a strategic choice about the quality of hospitals they apply to. Through a mix of theoretical and experimental results, we study the effect of this strategic choice on the preferences submitted by participants, as well as on the overall welfare. We find that residents choices in our model mimic the behavior observed in real systems where individuals apply to a mix of positions consisting mostly of places where they are reasonably likely to get accepted, as well as a few reach applications to hospitals of very high quality, and a few safe applications to hospitals of lower than their expected level. Surprisingly, the number of such safe applications is not monotone in the number of allowed applications. We also find that selfish behavior can hurt social welfare, but the deterioration of overall welfare is very minimal.
We develop a computationally efficient technique to solve a fairly general distributed service provision problem with selfish users and imperfect information. In particular, in a context in which the service capacity of the existing infrastructure ca
We study secretary problems in settings with multiple agents. In the standard secretary problem, a sequence of arbitrary awards arrive online, in a random order, and a single decision maker makes an immediate and irrevocable decision whether to accep
The Bitcoin protocol prescribes certain behavior by the miners who are responsible for maintaining and extending the underlying blockchain; in particular, miners who successfully solve a puzzle, and hence can extend the chain by a block, are supposed
We study a class of games which model the competition among agents to access some service provided by distributed service units and which exhibit congestion and frustration phenomena when service units have limited capacity. We propose a technique, b
We consider a game-theoretical problem called selfish 2-dimensional bin packing game, a generalization of the 1-dimensional case already treated in the literature. In this game, the items to be packed are rectangles, and the bins are unit squares. Th