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Security Pricing as an Enabler of Cyber-Insurance: A First Look at Differentiated Pricing Markets

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 نشر من قبل Ranjan Pal
 تاريخ النشر 2016
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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Despite the promising potential of network risk management services (e.g., cyber-insurance) to improve information security, their deployment is relatively scarce, primarily due to such service companies being unable to guarantee profitability. As a novel approach to making cyber-insurance services more viable, we explore a symbiotic relationship between security vendors (e.g., Symantec) capable of price differentiating their clients, and cyber-insurance agencies having possession of information related to the security investments of their clients. The goal of this relationship is to (i) allow security vendors to price differentiate their clients based on security investment information from insurance agencies, (ii) allow the vendors to make more profit than in homogeneous pricing settings, and (iii) subsequently transfer some of the extra profit to cyber-insurance agencies to make insurance services more viable. oindent In this paper, we perform a theoretical study of a market for differentiated security product pricing, primarily with a view to ensuring that security vendors (SVs) make more profit in the differentiated pricing case as compared to the case of non-differentiated pricing. In order to practically realize such pricing markets, we propose novel and emph{computationally efficient} consumer differentiated pricing mechanisms for SVs based on (i) the market structure, (ii) the communication network structure of SV consumers captured via a consumers emph{Bonacich centrality} in the network, and (iii) security investment amounts made by SV consumers.



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