اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدA New Graphical Password Scheme Resistant to Shoulder-Surfing
196
0
0.0
(
0
)
اسأل ChatGPT حول البحث
ﻻ يوجد ملخص باللغة العربية
Shoulder-surfing is a known risk where an attacker can capture a password by direct observation or by recording the authentication session. Due to the visual interface, this problem has become exacerbated in graphical passwords. There have been some graphical schemes resistant or immune to shoulder-surfing, but they have significant usability drawbacks, usually in the time and effort to log in. In this paper, we propose and evaluate a new shoulder-surfing resistant scheme which has a desirable usability for PDAs. Our inspiration comes from the drawing input method in DAS and the association mnemonics in Story for sequence retrieval. The new scheme requires users to draw a curve across their password images orderly rather than click directly on them. The drawing input trick along with the complementary measures, such as erasing the drawing trace, displaying degraded images, and starting and ending with randomly designated images provide a good resistance to shouldersurfing. A preliminary user study showed that users were able to enter their passwords accurately and to remember them over time.
قيم البحث
اقرأ أيضاً
Text-based password schemes have inherent security and usability problems, leading to the development of graphical password schemes. However, most of these alternate schemes are vulnerable to spyware attacks. We propose a new scheme, using CAPTCHA (C
ompletely Automated Public Turing tests to tell Computers and Humans Apart) that retaining the advantages of graphical password schemes, while simultaneously raising the cost of adversaries by orders of magnitude. Furthermore, some primary experiments are conducted and the results indicate that the usability should be improved in the future work.
Given the nature of mobile devices and unlock procedures, unlock authentication is a prime target for credential leaking via shoulder surfing, a form of an observation attack. While the research community has investigated solutions to minimize or pre
vent the threat of shoulder surfing, our understanding of how the attack performs on current systems is less well studied. In this paper, we describe a large online experiment (n=1173) that works towards establishing a baseline of shoulder surfing vulnerability for current unlock authentication systems. Using controlled video recordings of a victim entering in a set of 4- and 6-length PINs and Android unlock patterns on different phones from different angles, we asked participants to act as attackers, trying to determine the authentication input based on the observation. We find that 6-digit PINs are the most elusive attacking surface where a single observation leads to just 10.8% successful attacks, improving to 26.5% with multiple observations. As a comparison, 6-length Android patterns, with one observation, suffered 64.2% attack rate and 79.9% with multiple observations. Removing feedback lines for patterns improves security from 35.3% and 52.1% for single and multiple observations, respectively. This evidence, as well as other results related to hand position, phone size, and observation angle, suggests the best and worst case scenarios related to shoulder surfing vulnerability which can both help inform users to improve their security choices, as well as establish baselines for researchers.
The major problem of user registration, mostly text base password, is well known. In the login user be inclined to select simple passwords which is frequently in mind that are straightforward for attackers to guess, difficult machine created password
mostly complicated to user take in mind. User authenticate password using cued click points and Persuasive Cued Click Points graphical password scheme which includes usability and security evaluations. This paper includes the persuasion to secure user authentication & graphical password using cued click-points so that users select more random or more difficult to guess the passwords. In click-based graphical passwords, image or video frame that provide database to load the image, and then store all information into database. Mainly passwords are composed of strings which have letters as well as digits. Example is alpha-numeric type letters and digits.
We propose that by integrating behavioural biometric gestures---such as drawing figures on a touch screen---with challenge-response based cognitive authentication schemes, we can benefit from the properties of both. On the one hand, we can improve th
e usability of existing cognitive schemes by significantly reducing the number of challenge-response rounds by (partially) relying on the hardness of mimicking carefully designed behavioural biometric gestures. On the other hand, the observation resistant property of cognitive schemes provides an extra layer of protection for behavioural biometrics; an attacker is unsure if a failed impersonation is due to a biometric failure or a wrong response to the challenge. We design and develop an instantiation of such a hybrid scheme, and call it BehavioCog. To provide security close to a 4-digit PIN---one in 10,000 chance to impersonate---we only need two challenge-response rounds, which can be completed in less than 38 seconds on average (as estimated in our user study), with the advantage that unlike PINs or passwords, the scheme is secure under observation.
Graphical passwords have been demonstrated to be the possible alternatives to traditional alphanumeric passwords. However, they still tend to follow predictable patterns that are easier to attack. The crux of the problem is users memory limitations.
Users are the weakest link in password authentication mechanism. It shows that baroque music has positive effects on human memorizing and learning. We introduce baroque music to the PassPoints graphical password scheme and conduct a laboratory study in this paper. Results shown that there is no statistic difference between the music group and the control group without music in short-term recall experiments, both had high recall success rates. But in long-term recall, the music group performed significantly better. We also found that the music group tended to set significantly more complicated passwords, which are usually more resistant to dictionary and other guess attacks. But compared with the control group, the music group took more time to log in both in short-term and long-term tests. Besides, it appears that background music does not work in terms of hotspots.
سجل دخول لتتمكن من نشر تعليقات
التعليقات
جاري جلب التعليقات
سجل دخول لتتمكن من متابعة معايير البحث التي قمت باختيارها
