اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدQualified Trust, not Surveillance, is the Basis of a Stable Society
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Dirk Helbing
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Peaceful citizens and hard-working taxpayers are under government surveillance. Confidential communication of journalists is intercepted. Civilians are killed by drones, without a chance to prove their innocence. How could it come that far? And what are the alternatives?
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