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Social Network Games with Obligatory Product Selection

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 نشر من قبل EPTCS
 تاريخ النشر 2013
  مجال البحث الهندسة المعلوماتية
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Recently, Apt and Markakis introduced a model for product adoption in social networks with multiple products, where the agents, influenced by their neighbours, can adopt one out of several alternatives (products). To analyze these networks we introduce social network games in which product adoption is obligatory. We show that when the underlying graph is a simple cycle, there is a polynomial time algorithm allowing us to determine whether the game has a Nash equilibrium. In contrast, in the arbitrary case this problem is NP-complete. We also show that the problem of determining whether the game is weakly acyclic is co-NP hard. Using these games we analyze various types of paradoxes that can arise in the considered networks. One of them corresponds to the well-known Braess paradox in congestion games. In particular, we show that social networks exist with the property that by adding an additional product to a specific node, the choices of the nodes will unavoidably evolve in such a way that everybody is strictly worse off.



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