اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدTaking the Final Step to a Full Dichotomy of the Possible Winner Problem in Pure Scoring Rules
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Dorothea Baumeister
تاريخ النشر
2011
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الهندسة المعلوماتية
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English
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The Possible Winner problem asks, given an election where the voters preferences over the candidates are specified only partially, whether a designated candidate can become a winner by suitably extending all the votes. Betzler and Dorn [1] proved a result that is only one step away from a full dichotomy of this problem for the important class of pure scoring rules in the case of unweighted voters and an unbounded number of candidates: Possible Winner is NP-complete for all pure scoring rules except plurality, veto, and the scoring rule with vector (2,1,...,1,0), but is solvable in polynomial time for plurality and veto. We take the final step to a full dichotomy by showing that Possible Winner is NP-complete also for the scoring rule with vector (2,1,...,1,0).
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