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تسجيل مستخدم جديدBoltzmann brains and the scale-factor cutoff measure of the multiverse
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To make predictions for an eternally inflating multiverse, one must adopt a procedure for regulating its divergent spacetime volume. Recently, a new test of such spacetime measures has emerged: normal observers - who evolve in pocket universes cooling from hot big bang conditions - must not be vastly outnumbered by Boltzmann brains - freak observers that pop in and out of existence as a result of rare quantum fluctuations. If the Boltzmann brains prevail, then a randomly chosen observer would be overwhelmingly likely to be surrounded by an empty world, where all but vacuum energy has redshifted away, rather than the rich structure that we observe. Using the scale-factor cutoff measure, we calculate the ratio of Boltzmann brains to normal observers. We find the ratio to be finite, and give an expression for it in terms of Boltzmann brain nucleation rates and vacuum decay rates. We discuss the conditions that these rates must obey for the ratio to be acceptable, and we discuss estimates of the rates under a variety of assumptions.
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Predictions in an eternally inflating multiverse are meaningless unless we specify the probability measure. The scale-factor cutoff is perhaps the simplest and most successful measure which avoid catastrophic problems such as the youngness paradox, r
unaway problem, and Boltzmann brain problem, but it is not well defined in contracting regions with a negative cosmological constant. In this paper, we propose a new measure with properties similar to the scale-factor cutoff which is well defined everywhere. The measure is defined by a cutoff in the 4-volume spanned by infinitesimal comoving neighborhoods in a congruence of timelike geodesics. The probability distributions for the cosmological constant and for the curvature parameter in this measure are similar to those for the scale factor cutoff and are in a good agreement with observations.
Some modern cosmological models predict the appearance of Boltzmann Brains: observers who randomly fluctuate out of a thermal bath rather than naturally evolving from a low-entropy Big Bang. A theory in which most observers are of the Boltzmann Brain
type is generally thought to be unacceptable, although opinions differ. I argue that such theories are indeed unacceptable: the real problem is with fluctuations into observers who are locally identical to ordinary observers, and their existence cannot be swept under the rug by a choice of probability distributions over observers. The issue is not that the existence of such observers is ruled out by data, but that the theories that predict them are cognitively unstable: they cannot simultaneously be true and justifiably believed.
Eternally inflating universes lead to an infinite number of Boltzmann brains but also an infinite number of ordinary observers. If we use the scale factor measure to regularize these infinities, the ordinary observers dominate the Boltzmann brains if
the vacuum decay rate of each vacuum is larger than its Boltzmann brain nucleation rate. Here we point out that nucleation of small black holes should be counted in the vacuum decay rate, and this rate is always larger than the Boltzmann brain rate, if the minimum Boltzmann brain mass is more than the Planck mass. We also discuss nucleation of small, rapidly inflating regions, which may also have a higher rate than Boltzmann brains. This process also affects the distribution of the different vacua in eternal inflation.
Many modern cosmological scenarios feature large volumes of spacetime in a de Sitter vacuum phase. Such models are said to be faced with a Boltzmann Brain problem - the overwhelming majority of observers with fixed local conditions are random fluctua
tions in the de Sitter vacuum, rather than arising via thermodynamically sensible evolution from a low-entropy past. We argue that this worry can be straightforwardly avoided in the Many-Worlds (Everett) approach to quantum mechanics, as long as the underlying Hilbert space is infinite-dimensional. In that case, de Sitter settles into a truly stationary quantum vacuum state. While there would be a nonzero probability for observing Boltzmann-Brain-like fluctuations in such a state, observation refers to a specific kind of dynamical process that does not occur in the vacuum (which is, after all, time-independent). Observers are necessarily out-of-equilibrium physical systems, which are absent in the vacuum. Hence, the fact that projection operators corresponding to states with observers in them do not annihilate the vacuum does not imply that such observers actually come into existence. The Boltzmann Brain problem is therefore much less generic than has been supposed.
It is well known that anthropic selection from a landscape with a flat prior distribution of cosmological constant Lambda gives a reasonable fit to observation. However, a realistic model of the multiverse has a physical volume that diverges with tim
e, and the predicted distribution of Lambda depends on how the spacetime volume is regulated. We study a simple model of the multiverse with probabilities regulated by a scale-factor cutoff, and calculate the resulting distribution, considering both positive and negative values of Lambda. The results are in good agreement with observation. In particular, the scale-factor cutoff strongly suppresses the probability for values of Lambda that are more than about ten times the observed value. We also discuss several qualitative features of the scale-factor cutoff, including aspects of the distributions of the curvature parameter Omega and the primordial density contrast Q.
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