اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدImpact of Vehicular Communications Security on Transportation Safety
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نشر من قبل
Panos Papadimitratos
تاريخ النشر
2008
مجال البحث
الهندسة المعلوماتية
والبحث باللغة
English
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Transportation safety, one of the main driving forces of the development of vehicular communication (VC) systems, relies on high-rate safety messaging (beaconing). At the same time, there is consensus among authorities, industry, and academia on the need to secure VC systems. With specific proposals in the literature, a critical question must be answered: can secure VC systems be practical and satisfy the requirements of safety applications, in spite of the significant communication and processing overhead and other restrictions security and privacy-enhancing mechanisms impose? To answer this question, we investigate in this paper the following three dimensions for secure and privacy-enhancing VC schemes: the reliability of communication, the processing overhead at each node, and the impact on a safety application. The results indicate that with the appropriate system design, including sufficiently high processing power, applications enabled by secure VC can be in practice as effective as those enabled by unsecured VC.
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This is a report and a collection of abstracts from the Feb. 2008 Lausanne Workshop on Secure Vehicular Communication Systems.
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Significant developments have taken place over the past few years in the area of vehicular communication (VC) systems. Now, it is well understood in the community that security and protection of private user information are a prerequisite for the dep
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