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تسجيل مستخدم جديدUrban and Scientific Segregation: The Schelling-Ising Model
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Urban segregation of different communities, like blacks and whites in the USA, has been simulated by Ising-like models since Schelling 1971. This research was accompanied by a scientific segregation, with sociologists and physicists ignoring each other until 2000. We review recent progress and also present some new two-temperature multi-cultural simulations.
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