اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدLack of consensus in social systems
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We propose an exactly solvable model for the dynamics of voters in a two-party system. The opinion formation process is modeled on a random network of agents. The dynamical nature of interpersonal relations is also reflected in the model, as the connections in the network evolve with the dynamics of the voters. In the infinite time limit, an exact solution predicts the emergence of consensus, for arbitrary initial conditions. However, before consensus is reached, two different metastable states can persist for exponentially long times. One state reflects a perfect balancing of opinions, the other reflects a completely static situation. An estimate of the associated lifetimes suggests that lack of consensus is typical for large systems.
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