اشترك بالحزمة الذهبية واحصل على وصول غير محدود شمرا أكاديميا
تسجيل مستخدم جديدEmpirical analysis and statistical modeling of attack processes based on honeypots
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Mohamed Kaaniche
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Honeypots are more and more used to collect data on malicious activities on the Internet and to better understand the strategies and techniques used by attackers to compromise target systems. Analysis and modeling methodologies are needed to support the characterization of attack processes based on the data collected from the honeypots. This paper presents some empirical analyses based on the data collected from the Leurr{e}.com honeypot platforms deployed on the Internet and presents some preliminary modeling studies aimed at fulfilling such objectives.
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