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تسجيل مستخدم جديدJack The Rippler: Arbitrage on the Decentralized Exchange of the XRP Ledger
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The XRP Ledger (XRPL) is a peer-to-peer cryptographic ledger. It features a decentralized exchange (DEX) where network participants can issue and trade user-defined digital assets and currencies. We present Jack the Rippler, a bot that identifies and exploits arbitrage opportunities on the XRPL DEX. We describe the Jacks arbitrage process and discuss risks associated with using arbitrage bots.
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